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Abstract: Many ecosystem services are public goods whose provision depends on the spatial
pattern of land use. The pattern of land use is often determined by the decisions of multiple
private landowners. Increasing the provision of ecosystem services, while beneficial for society
as a whole, may be costly to private landowners. A regulator interested in providing incentives to
landowners for increased provision of ecosystem services often lacks complete information on
landowners’ costs. The combination of spatially-dependent benefits and asymmetric cost
information means that the optimal provision of ecosystem services cannot be achieved using
standard regulatory or payment for ecosystem services (PES) approaches. Here we show that an
auction that pays a landowner for the increased value of ecosystem services generated by the
landowner’s actions provides incentives for landowners to truthfully reveal cost information, and
allows the regulator to implement the optimal provision of ecosystem services, even in the case
with spatially-dependent benefits and asymmetric information.
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1. Introduction
Ecosystems provide many goods and services that contribute to human well-being
(“ecosystem services”). For example, ecosystems regulate local climate through effects on water
cycling and temperature and global climate through carbon sequestration, mediate nutrient
cycling and processes that enhance soil fertility and improve water quality, and provide
opportunities for recreation and aesthetic appreciation (Daily 1997, MA 2005). Because many
ecosystem services, including climate regulation and water quality improvement, are public
goods available to everyone without charge, private landowners are often uncompensated for
their contribution to ecosystem service production and under-provision of these services is a
likely result.
A potential solution to the under-provision of ecosystem services is to provide
landowners with payments for ecosystem services (PES). A PES program is a voluntary
incentive-based program that pays landowners for their contribution to the provision of
ecosystem services. A prominent example of a PES program is Costa Rica’s 1996 National
Forest Law that pays landowners to conserve forests for carbon sequestration, water quality
improvement, habitat, and scenic beauty. Though not originally designed as a PES program, the
U.S. Conservation Reserve Program fulfills much the same purpose by paying landowners to
retire land from active crop production, which contributes to provision of a number of ecosystem
services (e.g., water quality improvement carbon sequestration, habitat provision).
An optimal PES program will result in land being put to its “highest and best use,” which
here is defined as the land use that maximizes total benefits to society, including the value of
ecosystem services. Optimal PES programs, or other policies that involve provision of public
goods from landscapes, must overcome three related challenges. First, provision of ecosystem
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services often depends on the spatial configuration of land use. For example, in comparing
landscapes with the same overall amount of habitat, the success of many species tends to be
higher on landscapes where habitat is clustered rather than fragmented (e.g., Fahrig 2003).
Second, the optimal provision of a public good on landscapes requires coordination among
multiple private landowners. When spatial configuration matters, the contribution of each private
land parcel to aggregate ecosystem service provision will be a function of the decisions of all
other landowners; thus, optimal land-use decisions are interdependent. Third, landowners
typically have private information about their cost for undertaking actions to increase ecosystem
service provision. The cost of increasing ecosystem service provision on a particular land parcel
will depend on parcel or landowner characteristics (e.g., land productivity or skills, knowledge,
and preferences of landowners) that are often known only by the landowner. In other words,
there is asymmetric information between an agency representing the interests of society as a
whole in providing ecosystem services (hereafter, the “regulator”) and the landowners whose
decisions affect the provision of these services.
The combination of spatially-dependent benefits and multiple landowners with private
cost information makes achieving optimal land use exceedingly difficult. Simple top-down
regulatory approaches, such as zoning, will fail because the regulator does not have information
about cost and so does not know the optimal solution to target. Simple PES or other incentivebased approaches that pay each landowner according to their actions alone will also fail because
they do not account for spatial interdependence of benefits. An optimal solution requires taking
into account the information of landowners and the spatial interdependence of benefits across
landowners.
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In contrast, when the regulator has complete information about the cost to landowners of
increasing ecosystem service provision simple regulatory or PES schemes can be used to
maximize the net benefits from the landscape. When the landowners’ costs are known, the
regulator can determine what land uses are optimal and can either mandate this outcome via
regulation or offer payments to induce landowners to choose this outcome. This approach works
equally well with spatially-dependent and spatially-independent benefits. Finding an optimal
solution with spatially-dependent benefits can be challenging but spatial dependency by itself
does not pose an insurmountable obstacle to optimal implementation.
It is also the case that asymmetric information by itself does not prevent implementation
of optimal PES programs (though it does prevent optimal implementation via top-down
regulation). When the contribution of a parcel to the value of ecosystem services depends only
on the characteristics of the land parcel itself (i.e., there are no spatial dependencies), the
regulator can implement an optimal solution by simply offering a payment equal to the parcel’s
contribution to benefits. Only landowners with private costs below their parcel’s incremental
value will want to participate, accept the payment and take actions to increase provision of
ecosystem services. In this case, the optimal solution is obtained despite asymmetric information.
Neither regulation nor simple PES mechanisms, however, achieve an optimal solution with the
combination of assymetric information and spatially-dependent benefits.
In this paper, we present a PES scheme that achieves optimal provision of ecosystem
services with spatially-dependent benefits and asymmetric information. Our approach builds
from the mechanism design literature in economics on the optimal provision of public goods
(Groves 1973, Groves and Ledyard 1977), combining elements of a Vickrey auction that induces
auction participants to truthfully reveal private information (Vickrey 1961), with Pigouvian
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subsidies that provide optimal incentives by paying landowners for their incremental
contribution to the value of ecosystem services. Under our mechanism, landowners
simultaneously submit bids specifying the minimum price they would accept to undertake an
action to increase provision of ecosystem services on their land. A landowner’s bid is accepted if
and only if doing so increases the value of ecosystem services from the landscape as a whole by
at least as much as the bid. If the bid is accepted, the landowner is paid the value of their parcel’s
contribution to ecosystem services. Since the payment amount is independent of the landowner’s
bid, it is a dominant strategy for landowners to bid exactly their cost. With this cost information,
the regulator can identify the set of parcels that maximizes the net benefits from the landscape,
determine the incremental benefits generated by each parcel selected for enrollment, and pay
landowners accordingly. With spatially-dependent benefits, the value generated by an individual
parcel, and hence the payment to each landowner, is a function of land uses on all parcels and so
can only be determined once all bids are submitted.
Economists and others have recognized that implementing optimal land use with
spatially-dependent benefits and private information is a challenging but important task (e.g.,
Drechsler et al. 2010), which we briefly summarize here (see Supplementary Information Text
S1 for a more in-depth literature review). One strand of literature investigates the ability of
incentive policies to affect the spatial pattern of land use and associated levels of ecosystems
services (e.g., Parkhurst et al. 2002, Lewis et al. 2011), but none have identified a general
mechanism for achieving an optimal solution in this setting. A separate strand of literature finds
numerical solutions for optimal land use assuming the regulator has complete information as
well as control over all land-use decisions (e.g., Church et al. 1996, Polasky et al. 2008). Several
prior papers study auctions for land conservation mostly with an emphasis on how auctions can
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be used to reduce government expenditures (e.g., Stoneham et al. 2003, Kirwan et al. 2005). Our
study is most closely related to papers in the economics literature on information-revealing
mechanisms for optimal pollution control (Kwerel 1977, Dasgupta et al. 2000, Montero 2008).
However, none of these papers consider spatially-dependent benefits.

2. A Simple Example
We start with a simple example of a landscape composed of a 2×4 grid of land parcels
(Fig. 1) to set ideas and demonstrate the challenge of finding the optimal land-use pattern with
spatially-dependent benefits and asymmetric information. Each parcel can either be “conserved,”
in which case it provides ecosystem services that are public goods, or “developed,” in which case
it provides a monetary return to the landowner. The cost of conserving a parcel (foregone
development value) measured in monetary terms is indicated by the top number in each parcel,
while the ecosystem services provided by conserving the parcel, measured in biophysical terms
are indicated along the bottom (Fig. 1). The first number is the ecosystem services provided
when the parcel is conserved and benefits are spatially independent or when benefits are spatially
dependent but no adjacent parcel is conserved. When benefits are spatially-dependent, the second
number is the level of ecosystem services provided when one neighboring parcel is also
conserved, and so on for two, and three conserved neighbors. Only parcels that share a side (not
corners) are considered neighbors. The monetary value of a unit of ecosystem service is denoted
by V. The value of ecosystem services provided by a conserved parcel is equal to V multiplied by
the biophysical units of ecosystem services provided.
For comparison purposes, we start with the case of no spatial dependencies and complete
information about costs. Given a value of V, the optimal solution can be found by comparing the
benefits (V × units of services) to costs on each parcel and conserving parcels whose benefits are
6|Page

at least as great as costs. For example, with V=0.25, the benefits from conserving A2 are 0.25×5
= 1.25, which is greater than the cost of 1. The criterion is also satisfied for B3 but is not for
other parcels. If V=0.33, then B2 is optimally conserved along with A2 and B3.
We next add spatial dependencies but continue to assume complete information about
costs. Because the level of the services increases when we add spatial dependencies, the
solutions to the spatially independent and spatially dependent net benefits maximization
problems at a given value of V are not comparable. Consider the optimal landscape when
V=0.25. The optimal solution can be determined by enumerating all possible conservation
combinations and determining which combination yields the highest net benefits (code for
finding the optimal landscape can be found in the Supplementary Information SI Text 5). In this
case, the optimal solution is to conserve A1, A2, B1, B2, and B3, which yields benefits of
(11+10+3+9+8)*0.25, and a cost of (3+1+1+1+1), generating net benefits of 3.25. For
comparison, the next highest potential net benefits is achieved by conserving A2, B2, and B3,
which generates net benefits of 3. Comparing the net benefits from these two potential solutions
highlights the role of spatial dependencies in determining the optimal landscape. Adding A1 and
B1 to the configuration of A2, B2, and B3 increases ecosystem service provision because: i) two
new parcels are conserved, and ii) the addition of A1 increases the provision on neighboring
parcel A2 and B1, while the addition of B1 increases the provision on neighboring parcels A1
and B2.
With complete information about costs of conservation, the regulator can implement the
optimal solution by targeting payments to the parcels that make up the optimal solution (e.g., A2
and B3 in the spatially independent case, and A1, A2, B1, B2, and B3 in the spatially dependent
case). The only requirement is that payments equal or exceed landowners’ costs. Thus, to
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conserve A1, A2, B1, B2, and B3, the regulator needs to offer payments of at least 3, 1, 1, 1, and
1, respectively. This type of targeting approach works whether benefits are spatially independent
or spatially dependent.
With incomplete information about costs, however, another approach is needed. In the
case of spatially-independent benefits, the regulator can still obtain the optimal solution using a
payment to each landowner equal to the benefits generated by their parcel when conserved. To
implement the solution from above involving A2 and B3, all landowners are offered 0.25 times
the ecosystem services provision of their parcel. This amount is greater than or equal to costs
only for A2 and B3 and, thus, only these two landowners agree to conserve their parcels.
Implementing the optimal solution is much more complex with both asymmetric cost
information and spatially-dependent benefits. In this case, the regulator cannot achieve an
optimal solution by targeting payments or setting them equal to a parcel’s contribution to
benefits. With spatially-dependent benefits, the benefits of conserving any individual parcel
cannot be determined without knowledge of which other parcels are also conserved. But without
information about costs, the regulator cannot identify the set of parcels that are optimal to
conserve. For example, net benefits decrease when either A1 or B1 are separately added to the
configuration of A2, B2, and B3. However, adding both A1 and B1 to the configuration of A2,
B2, and B3 increases net benefits from 3 to 3.25. If, on the other hand, the costs of conserving
B1 were 2 instead of 1 then it would not be optimal to conserve either A1 or B1. The optimal
landscape cannot be determined without cost information for each parcel.
A regulator that only uses available information on benefits may obtain a solution that is
far from optimal because parcels with high benefits may also have high costs and generate
relatively low net benefits. For example, A3 always provides higher benefits than B1 with any
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number of conserved neighbors, and yet B1 is optimally conserved and A3 is not. Starting with
the optimal landscape, if A3 is conserved rather than B1, net benefits fall to 2.25 from 3.25 under
the optimal solution.
In sum, with spatially dependent benefits, the problem of finding the optimal land-use
pattern that provides the highest level of net benefits cannot be solved on a parcel-by-parcel
basis. Finding the optimal solution involves calculating benefits across the entire landscape to
factor in spatial dependencies and requires information about costs. Simple mechanisms
sufficient for cases without asymmetric information or spatially dependent benefits do not solve
the problem with both asymmetric information and spatially dependent benefits. We develop an
alternative approach that solves this problem in the next section.

3. The Auction Mechanism
There are i = 1, 2, …, N land parcels in a landscape, each owned by a different individual.
On each parcel, the landowner chooses between a land use that potentially provides a greater
level of ecosystem services but lower direct monetary return to the landowner (“conservation”),
or one that provides a low level of ecosystem services but higher direct monetary return
(“development”).. Let xi = 1 when parcel i is conserved and 0 when parcel i is developed. The
binary vector X = (x1, x2, …, xN) describes the landscape pattern of conserved and developed
parcels. It is straightforward to expand the number of land use alternatives available to
landowner but doing so complicates notation without adding more insight so we stick to binary
choice representation here.
The function B(X) converts the landscape pattern (X) into the monetary value of
ecosystem services provided on the landscape. Because of spatial interdependence, the increase
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in B when parcel i is conserved may be a function of the pattern of conservation on other parcels
j ≠ i . We assume that the benefits function B(X) is common knowledge.
The owner of parcel i earns a return ci ≥ 0 if the parcel is developed and 0 if the parcel is
conserved (i.e., ci is the cost of conservation). We assume that ci is known only by the owner of
parcel i, while all other landowners and the regulator only know the distribution of possible
values of ci. Because we solve for the dominant strategy equilibrium, assumptions about the
distribution of ci do not affect the analysis (Montero 2008).
The regulator wishes to implement the land-use pattern, X* = (x1*, x2*, …, xN*), that
maximizes net social benefits. The optimal land use pattern is given by:
N

X * = arg max[ B ( X ) − ∑ x i c i ] .
i =1

If the regulator knew each ci then, in principle, this solution could be solved without the auction
mechanism. In practice, finding the optimal solution can be a difficult problem and often search
algorithms that find good, though not necessarily optimal, solutions are used (e.g., Polasky et al.
2008). However, without knowledge of costs, the auction is needed to reveal costs in order to
determine the optimal solution..
In the auction, each landowner i simultaneously submits a bid si. Upon receiving the bids
the regulator decides which bids to accept and which to reject. If the bid of landowner i is
accepted, parcel i is conserved and the regulator pays the landowner an amount pi. If the bid of
landowner i is rejected, parcel i is developed and the landowner receives ci. We assume no
collusion in bids across landowners, and elaborate on the importance of this assumption in the
discussion section.
To determine which bids to accept and the amount of payment to a landowner whose bid
is accepted, the regulator first calculates the expected social benefits of conserving parcel i, ∆Wi.
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To do this calculation, the regulator assumes that the bid of landowner i is equal to the cost of
conserving parcel i (i.e., si = ci). Since the regulator knows the benefits function for the landscape
B(X), observing si (assuming that si = ci) means the regulator can calculate the expected social
net benefits of conserving parcel i. The regulator calculates the expected social benefits of
conserving parcel i, ∆Wi, with the following steps:
1) Solve for the set of parcels to conserve that maximize social net benefits assuming that
parcel i will be conserved, Xi* = (x1i*, x2i*,…, xi-1i*, 1, xi+1i*, …, xNi*);
2) Solve for the set of parcels to conserve that maximize social net benefits assuming that
parcel i will not be conserved, X~i* = (x1~i*, x2~i*,…, xi-1~i*, 0, xi+1~i*, …, xN~i*);
3) Find the social net benefits when parcel i is conserved net of the cost for parcel i:
Wi ( X i *) = B( X i *) − ∑ c j x ji * ;
j ≠i

4) Find the social net benefits when parcel i is not conserved:
Wi ( X ~i *) = B ( X ~i *) − ∑ c j x j ~i * ;
j ≠i

5) Take the difference between Wi ( X i *) andWi ( X i *) :
∆Wi = Wi ( X i *) − Wi ( X ~ i *)

.
= B ( X i *) − ∑ c j x ji * −  B( X ~i *) − ∑ c j x j ~i *
j ≠i
j ≠i


The regulator accepts the bid from landowner i if and only if ∆Wi ≥ si and pays
landowner i pi = ∆Wi if and only if the bid is accepted. We assume that the auction mechanism
is common knowledge.
Note that each landowner does not know the exact value of ∆Wi = pi when bids are
submitted because this amount depends in part on which other landowners bids will be accepted.
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However, landowner i understands that the payment pi is independent of the bid si as the
landowner’s bid is not used in steps 1-5 above. The bid level only affects whether or not the bid
is accepted, not the amount of the payment if the bid is accepted.
If benefits are spatially-independent, then ∆Wi is only a function of conservation on
parcel i. The only change between Xi* and X~i* is that parcel i is conserved in Xi* and developed
in X~i*. With spatially-dependent benefits, however, this need not be the case. Removing a
conserved parcel from the optimal solution may require a reconfiguration of conserved and
developed parcels. For example, suppose there are two parcels (1, 2) with B(0, 0) = 0, B(1, 0) =
B(0, 1) = 2, B(1, 1) = 8, c1 = c2 = 3. In this case it is optimal to conserve both parcels so that Xi*
= (1, 1). If, however, parcel i is left out of the solution, then it is better not to conserve parcel j as
conserving one parcel alone generates benefits of 2 but costs of 3. Therefore, X~i* = (0, 0).

4. Results
We first show that it is a dominant strategy for each landowner to bid their cost si = ci
under this auction mechanism (Proposition 1) and then that the auction mechanism yields an
optimal solution (Proposition 2).

Proposition 1: Under the auction mechanism described above, it is a dominant strategy for each
landowner i to bid si = ci. (See SI Text S2 for a formal proof).

The intuition for Proposition 1 can be seen by plotting the range of potential payments to
parcel i (pi) versus the range of potential bids (si) in relation to the cost ci (Figure 2). When the
landowner overbids (si > ci), there is the possibility that the bid will be rejected (si > pi) even
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though pi > ci so that the landowner would be better off with conservation. When the landowner
underbids (si < ci), there is the possibility that the bid will be accepted (si ≤ pi) even though pi <
ci so that the landowner would be better off with development. Bidding the opportunity cost,
si = ci , eliminates risk of losses from both over- and under-bidding.
For the landowner, it does not matter whether the benefits of conservation are simple or
complex; what matters is whether or not their bid will be accepted, and if it is accepted that the
payment from conservation (pi) is higher than the payment from development (ci). Truthful
bidding is the dominant strategy given the auction mechanism. This result relies on the
independence of payments and bids: pi = ∆Wi does not depend on si. The bid only affects
whether or not the bid is accepted, not the payment itself. The payment to landowner i depends
on the value of increases in ecosystem services with conservation, and the bids of landowners
other than i. This is true whether or not other landowners bid accurately. The landowner then
should choose to have the bid accepted if and only if pi ≥ ci which they can guarantee by
choosing si = ci .
Truthful revelation of costs is needed for implementation of the optimal solution with
spatially-dependent benefits. The conservation decision on some parcel j can affect the expected
benefits of conserving parcel i. Thus, without exact information about costs on each parcel the
regulator’s solution may deviate from the optimum. With cost information, the regulator can
choose which bids to accept and make the associated payments to get to an optimal solution.
Proposition 1 shows it is a dominant strategy for each landowner to choose si = ci. The following
proposition shows that the auction mechanism achieves an optimal solution.
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Proposition 2: When benefits are spatially-dependent, the auction mechanism generates the
optimal solution when the regulator 1) accepts bids if and only if si ≤ ∆Wi and 2) pays
landowner i pi = ∆Wi if the bid is accepted. (See SI Text S3 for a formal proof).

In an optimal solution it must be the case that the social benefits of conservation are at
least as great as the costs of conservation for all conserved parcels, and less than for all
developed parcels. Defining net benefits, ∆Wi, as the difference between the highest net benefits
when parcel i is included (but excluding the cost of parcel i) and the highest net benefits when
parcel i is not included, ensures that this is the proper rule defining an optimum. If ∆Wi is greater
than ci, then it is optimal to conserve parcel i, as it implies the net benefits of conserving parcel i
are positive. When the converse is true, then parcel i should not be conserved.
Together, propositions 1 and 2 show that the regulator can implement an optimal land-use
pattern with spatially-dependent benefits through the auction mechanism described. Spatiallydependent benefits can make finding an optimal solution more difficult and magnifies potential
losses from mistakes but does not interfere with the incentive mechanism that enables the
regulator to implement the optimal solution.

5. The simple example revisited
To illustrate the auction mechanism, we return to the simple example from section 2 with
V=0.25. As discussed earlier, X* entails the conservation of parcels A1, A2, B1, B2, and B3,
providing total net benefits of B(X*) = 3.25. Table 1 shows the calculation of conservation
payments under the auction mechanism. For each parcel, we compute the optimal landscape with
parcel i (Xi*), the net benefits of Xi* without including the cost of parcel i (Wi(Xi*)), the optimal
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landscape without conserving parcel i (X~i*), and the net benefits of X~i* (Wi(X~i*)). From Table
1 we can see that the optimal payment, pi = ∆Wi, is greater than or equal to the cost of
conservation, ci, for optimally conserved parcels, and pi = ∆Wi < ci if parcel i is optimally
developed.

6. Discussion
This paper examines the implementation of a PES program through an auction
mechanism when ecosystem service provision depends on the spatial pattern of conservation
across multiple landowners, each with private information about their cost of conservation.
Spatial dependencies characterize many ecosystem services, with habitat provision, pollination
and nutrient filtering for clean water being three prominent examples. Because the opportunity
cost of conservation will almost always depend on landowner characteristics that are privately
known (e.g., landowner skills and preferences), asymmetric information is an important feature
of most voluntary PES programs. Spatial dependencies imply that the benefit of conserving a
given parcel will depend on the optimal pattern of conservation (i.e., what other parcels are also
conserved), but this cannot be determined without information on each landowner’s cost. Hence,
an optimal PES program for spatially-dependent ecosystem services cannot be implemented
without first addressing the problem of asymmetric information.
The auction mechanism proposed in this paper provides a surprisingly simple solution to
the optimal provision of ecosystem services. The mechanism differs from traditional PES
schemes by breaking the problem into two stages. First, the auction mechanism is used to
generate information on each landowner’s cost. Second, the regulator uses the cost information
to find a solution to the landscape level conservation problem and implements this solution by
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targeting payments to the owners of parcels that make up the optimal solution. By paying each
landowner an amount equal to the increase in social benefits with conservation of their parcel, an
amount that is independent of their bid, the auction mechanism applies the fundamental insight
of Vickrey auctions to break the link between a landowner’s bid and their payment, thereby
inducing truthful revelation of cost in the bidding stage.
Several additional issues deserve attention in connection with the auction mechanism
developed in this paper: i) potential collusion among landowners in bidding, ii) the commitment
of the planner to pay landowners the increase in social benefits of conservation even when bids
come in far lower than benefits, and iii) the case where it is costly to raise and distribute program
funds (i.e., there is a concern about the distribution of rents), or where there is a fixed
conservation budget.
In the auction it may be possible, though extremely difficult in practice, for landowners to
collude and, thereby, raise the payments the group receives from the regulator. A group of
landowners could potentially underbid in order to be awarded a conservation contract that would
not occur with truthful bidding. Underbidding as a team can be profitable even though it might
not be socially optimal. Consider a slight variation in the two-parcel example given above with
B(0, 0) = 0, B(1, 0) = B(0, 1) = 2, B(1, 1) = 8. Now assume that c1 = c2 = 5 (rather than 3). Here
the optimal the solution is to conserve neither parcel. However, if each landowner bids 2 rather
than their cost of 5, the regulator will choose to conserve both parcels. The regulator will pay
each landowner 6 because in this case:
∆Wi = Wi ( X i *) − Wi ( X ~i *) = (8 − 2) − 0 = 6.
Successful collusion requires both landowners to change their bids in a coordinated fashion. This
outcome is similar to each player in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game having a dominant strategy to
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defect while both are better off with cooperation. However, underbidding in this fashion is risky
because it is possible that landowners will be paid less than their cost. In general, successful
collusion has high information requirements. To guarantee success, a group of landowners would
need to compute the optimal solution to predict the planner’s outcome. But, to compute the
optimal solution the landowners would need private information about the costs of other
landowners as well as information about benefits. Landowners would also require an approach to
share collusive profits such that team members do not wish to deviate from the collusive strategy
(Montero 2008).
Truthfully bidding cost is a dominant strategy for each landowner when the regulator
commits ex-ante to paying landowners the social value of their increase in services. However, if
landowners believe the regulator will renegotiate after bids have been submitted, then truthtelling is no longer necessarily a dominant strategy. In this case, there would be an incentive to
inflate bids to mitigate the potential for downward renegotiation of payments. Therefore,
implementation of the auction mechanism requires that the regulator can credibly commit to
enforcement of the payment plan.
Under our auction mechanism, payments are based on the contribution of a landowner’s
parcel to the increase in the value of ecosystem services provided, which will in general be larger
than the landowner’s cost. The difference between benefits and cost, also referred to as
“information rents,” reflect the fact that landowners must be paid something to disclose their
private information. Information rents are an unavoidable feature of incentive schemes in the
presence of asymmetric information. Paying anything less than full benefits in an effort to reduce
information rents risks having some landowners for whom conservation is socially beneficial
choose not to conserve. Spatial dependencies can increase the size of information rents (see SI
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Text S4 and SI Figures 1 and 2 for more analysis of the information rents generated in our simple
example).
Economists have studied mechanisms designed to reduce information rents associated
with environmental policies (see Lewis, 1996, for a survey and Mason and Plantinga, 2013, for a
recent application). Mechanisms to reduce information rents involve a tradeoff between
maximizing social net benefits and reducing the budgetary costs of the regulating agency. If the
regulator must stay within a fixed budget, there is no guarantee that the (unconstrained) optimum
can be obtained. In this case, there can be parcels for which social net benefits of conservation
are positive but that cannot be afforded. It is a general finding of the mechanism design literature
that no balanced-budget mechanism can be found to always implement the optimal solution
(Walker 1980). Intuitively, by changing their bids, landowners can affect which parcels can be
afforded and so they may try to alter their bids to manipulate the outcome of the auction.
In general, even with complete information about conservation benefits and costs, solving
for the optimal land-use pattern can be difficult when there are spatial dependencies. Benefits
functions may be highly non-linear and the discreteness of the choice problem (e.g., conserve or
develop) introduces further complications. Furthermore, the optimal solution may not be unique.
In some applications, researchers use heuristic methods to find good – though not necessarily
optimal – solutions (e.g., Nalle et al. 2004, Nelson et al. 2008, Polasky et al. 2008). Lewis et al.
(2011) apply such methods to a large-scale integer programming problem for the Willamette
Basin of Oregon. They approximate the optimal solution under the assumption that the regulator
has complete information about costs and evaluate a range of targeted PES policies under the
assumption that the regulator knows only the cost distribution. They find that the net benefits
under the (approximate) optimal solution are always larger – and typically much larger – than
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those generated by the targeted PES policies. These results suggest that the proposed auction
mechanism will greatly outperform policies that are developed with incomplete information
about costs. Regardless of whether the optimum is found, or just approximated, the auction
mechanism developed in this paper can be used to implement the desired solution identified by
the regulator.
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Figure 1. Costs and biophysical provision of services from land conservation
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Figure 2: Illustration of Potential Losses from Over- and Under-Bidding. The landowner
would like to conserve if and only if pi ≥ci. Any bid (si) and price (pi) combination under the 45
degree line results in bids being rejected. Any bid (si) and price (pi) combination over the 45
degree line results in bids being accepted. The triangles show potential losses from over- or
under-bidding.
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Table 1. Optimal Payments in the Simple Example
∗
Parcel
Cost
ܺ∗
ܹ (ܺ∗ )
ܺ~
Optimally Conserved Parcels
A1
3
A1-A2,B1-B3
6.25
A2,B2-B3
A2
1
A1-A2,B1-B3
4.25
B2-B3
B1
1
A1-A2,B1-B3
4.25
A2,B2-B3
B2
1
A1-A2,B1-B3
4.25
A2-A3,B3
B3
1
A1-A2,B1-B3
4.25
A1-A2,B1-B2
Non-Conserved Parcels
A3
3
A1-A3,B1-B3
5.75
A1-A2,B1-B3
A4
3
All
5
A1-A2,B1-B3
B4
3
A1-A2,B1-B4
6
A1-A2,B1-B3

∗
ܹ (ܺ~
)

∆ܹ

3
1.5
3
0.75
2

3.25
2.75
1.25
3.5
2.25

3.25
3.25
3.25

2.5
1.75
2.75
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SUPPORTING INFORMATION
SI Text
SI 1. Relationship to Previous Literature on Spatially-Dependent Provision of Ecosystem
Services under Asymmetric Information
Previous studies have examined incentive policies to affect the spatial pattern of land use
and associated levels of ecosystems services, but none have identified a general mechanism for
achieving an optimal solution in this setting. For example, Smith and Shogren (1) evaluate an
optimal contract scheme for land preservation with asymmetric information but consider only the
special case of two adjacent landowners. Parkhurst et al. (2), Parkhurst and Shogren (3), and
Drechsler et al. (4) have studied an “agglomeration bonus” that provides an additional payment
to landowners who conserve adjacent habitat.
There is also a large literature devoted to finding optimal landscape patterns assuming
full information. A number of studies solve for the reserve network that maximizes quantitative
biodiversity indices subject to various constraints (e.g., 5 – 9). In some cases, these studies
account for spatial dependencies in the objective function (e.g., 10 – 14).
Lewis and Plantinga (15) and Lewis et al. (16) consider alternative approaches for
targeting afforestation payments designed to reduce forest fragmentation when the regulator does
not have full information on landowners’ willingness-to-accept (WTA) to participate in
afforestation. Lewis et al. (17) consider a suite of policies that target enrollment based on
observable parcel characteristics that proxy for marginal benefits and costs. They evaluate the
performance of the policies relative to the solution when the regulator has full information about
WTA and show that these targeted policies typically achieve a small fraction of the benefits that
are obtained by an optimal conservation policy under full information. While solving for the
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optimal landscape with spatial dependencies can be difficult even with full information, Lewis et
al. (17) find that even an approximately optimal solution developed under full information
greatly outperforms policies developed under incomplete cost information.
The use of auctions in the context of conservation has been examined in a set of papers
(18 – 22). This literature has emphasized the role of auctions in reducing information asymmetry
(18), the link between the information structure in auctions and landowner incentives (20), and
the ability of auctions to reduce costs to the government (21). These papers typically consider
auctions in which payments are linked to the bids submitted by landowners, giving incentives for
landowners to inflate bids. In a study of U.S. Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) contracts,
Kirwan et al. (21) find evidence that landowners systematically inflate their bid above cost.
Our auction mechanism differs from the prior conservation auction literature in that we
build from the fundamental insight from Vickery (23) and decouple payment from the
landowner’s bid. As such, our study is most closely related to the literature on informationrevealing mechanisms. Kwerel (24) develops a tradable permit and subsidy scheme in which it
is a Bayesian-Nash equilibrium for competitive firms to truthfully reveal private information
about pollution control costs and implement an optimal pollution abatement solution. Dasgupta
et al. (25) and Kim and Chang (26) develop mechanisms that implement an optimal solution
even with imperfect competition. Montero (27) develops a uniform-price auction that achieves
an optimal solution in which firms submit a demand schedule, and based on this, the regulator
sets the number of permits for sale and a partial rebate of auction revenues. These mechanisms
achieve an optimal solution in the context of pollution reduction because they induce firms to
correctly reveal information about cost of emissions reductions and provide incentives so that
firms choose the efficient emissions level. Our mechanism works similarly to Montero’s
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mechanism but in the context of providing ecosystem services. However, the benefit function in
our problem is more complex than in the pollution control problem because the provision of
conservation benefits can be spatially-dependent, i.e., the net benefits of conservation on one
land parcel depend on whether or not specific neighboring parcels are conserved. The benefits of
emissions control considered in the papers mentioned above, though they can depend on
aggregate pollution, are not spatially dependent as in our problem.

SI 2. Proof of proposition 1
Suppose the landowner bids si = ci. If si ≤ ∆Wi , the landowner’s bid will be accepted and the
landowner will receive a payment pi = ∆Wi ≥ ci . If si > ∆Wi , the landowner’s bid will be
rejected and the landowner will receive ci. We prove that bidding si = ci is a dominant strategy
by showing that this strategy generates equal or greater payoffs than overbidding (si > ci) or
underbidding (si < ci) over the range of possible values of ∆Wi .

Overbidding (si > ci )
Case (i): ∆Wi ≥ ci . When ∆Wi ≥ ci , then either a) ∆Wi ≥ si , in which case the
landowner’s bid will be accepted and the landowner will receive a payment pi = ∆Wi ≥ ci , which
is the same outcome as bidding si = ci, or b) ∆Wi < si , in which case the landowner’s bid will be
rejected and the landowner will earn a payoff of ci ≤ ∆Wi . In particular, when ci < ∆Wi < si ,
overbidding, si > ci , generates a lower payoff for the landowner than bidding si = ci.
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Case (ii): ∆Wi < ci . When ∆Wi < ci , then si > ∆Wi and the landowner’s bid will be
rejected. The landowner will develop the land and earn ci, which is the same outcome as would
have occurred had the landowner bid si = ci.
Therefore, overbidding, si > ci, is dominated by bidding si = ci.

Underbidding (si < ci)
Case (i): ∆Wi ≥ ci . When ∆Wi ≥ ci , then si < ci , the landowner’s bid will be accepted
and the landowner will receive a payment pi = ∆Wi ≥ ci , which is the same outcome as bidding
si = ci.
Case (ii): ∆Wi < ci . When si ≤ ∆Wi < ci , the bid is accepted and the landowner receives
a payment pi = ∆Wi < ci . Thus, bidding si < ci generates lower payoffs than bidding si = ci. If
si > ∆Wi , the landowner’s bid is rejected and the landowner earns ci, which is the same outcome
as would have occurred had the landowner bid si = ci.
Therefore, underbidding (si < ci) is dominated by bidding si = ci. QED

SI 3. Proof of Proposition 2
With full information about costs, the regulator can solve for X* that maximizes social net
benefits. Proposition 1 proves that landowners have a dominant strategy to bid si = ci under this
auction mechanism. Given that landowners bid truthfully, si = ci, we show that the auction
generates the optimal solution.
In an optimal solution it must be the case that ∆Wi ≥ ci for all conserved parcels in X*
and ∆Wi < ci for all developed parcels in X*, otherwise net social benefits could be increased by
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making a different choice about the conservation of parcel i. The social net benefits of
conservation conditional on parcel i being included in the solution is given by:
N

NB( X i *) = B( X i *) − ∑ ( x ji *)c j
j =1

where Xi* includes the optimally chosen set of other parcels j ≠ i. The net social benefits of
conservation conditional on parcel i not being conserved is given by:
N

NB( X ~i *) = B( X ~i *) − ∑ ( x j ~i *)c j
j =1

If the inclusion of parcel i increases net social benefits, then
NB(Xi*) – NB(X~i*) ≥ 0
Wi(Xi*) – ci – W(X~i*) ≥ 0

∆Wi ≥ ci
In the auction mechanism, parcel i will be conserved if and only if ∆Wi ≥ si . Because
landowners bid truthfully (Proposition 2), so that si = ci, we have that parcel i will be conserved
if and only if ∆Wi ≥ ci . QED

SI 4. Simulating the simple landscape
In the text we illustrate the problem of finding the optimal landscape pattern with
spatially-dependent benefits and asymmetric information on cost. Further, we describe how the
auction mechanism works on a 2 x 4 grid of land parcels with arbitrarily chosen parameter values
(Figure 1). Here we explore the performance of the auction mechanism on the simple landscape
over a large range of monetary values for a unit of ecosystem service (V) and random draws of
cost for conservation on a given parcel (ci). Each time we solve for the optimal landscape we
record payments to landowners, conservation cost (the sum of cost across parcels that are
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awarded a conservation contract), and information rents (the payment to the landowner minus the
cost).
Our simulation of optimal landscapes uses the following process,
1. We set an initial value of V: V = 0.02
2. We randomly select a ci value for each parcel on the landscape over the integer range
[0,4].
3. Using the spatial distribution of ecosystem services values from Figure 1 we solve for the
optimal landscape and record all the relevant data, including B(X*), sum of conservation
payments, the sum of conservation costs, and sum of information rents.
4. We conduct steps 2 through 3 1,000 times.
5. We increase V by 0.02 units and repeat steps 2 through 4.
6. The simulation stops once steps 2 through 4 have been conducted for V = 1.

In Figure S1 we graph the simulated mean and 5th and 95th percentile values of aggregate
conservation payment and conservation opportunity cost on optimal landscapes over the range of
modeled V (the MATLAB code for this simulation is found in SI Text 5).
As V increases parcels receive higher conservation payments. At V values of 0.4 and
greater all parcels on the 2 x 4 landscape are optimally conserved no matter the distribution of
costs. At very low values of V the information rents generated on the landscape are relatively
low. For example, from V = 0.02 to V = 0.30 and at simulation means (the black diamonds and
black circles), the aggregate information rent generated on the optimal landscape (the vertical
distance between black diamonds and black circles) is on par with the optimal landscape’s
conservation cost. However, as V increases to the point and beyond where the entire landscape is
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optimally conserved (V > 0.4) and conservation opportunity costs do not change as V increases,
information rents generated on the landscape grow quickly.
We also use the simulation to determine the effect of landscape heterogeneity on
information rents. Specifically, does a more uniform distribution of costs across the landscape
lead to increased or decreased information rents? To answer this question use a mean-preserving
spread on the random distribution of cost to isolate the impact of WTA variance on information
rents. We calculate the average ratio of aggregate information rent to conservation cost
generated on the optimal landscape over two dimensions, the value of V and the variance in
WTA values (Figure S2). (The MATLAB code for this simulation is in SI Text 6.)
At low levels of V, greater heterogeneity in cost across the landscape generates greater
information rents on average. At the highest levels of V, greater homogeneity in cost leads to
slightly higher information rents. This latter result can be explained by the fact that low levels of
variance in cost means that few to no low cost parcels are present on the landscape while
increasing V means that is optimal to pay all parcels a conservation payment. At the same time
payment levels are increasing as V gets larger. Therefore, a combination of high payments
across all parcels and little to no low cost anywhere on the landscape means the regulator can
expect relative aggregate information rent to be very high.

SI 5. MATLAB code for this simulation graphed in Figure S1
%
%
%
%

The code is constructed for a 2 x 4 landscape with spatially dependent
benefits. The rows are labeled A and B in the paper and the columns are
labeled 1 through 4 in the paper. A letter-number combination, for
example, A4, gives the parcel's address on the map.

% The C matrix gives conservation costs.
% The B1 matrix gives the conservation benefit (b) when no neighboring
% parcel is conserved.
% The B2 matrix gives the conservation benefit (b) when one neighboring
% parcel is conserved.
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% The B3 matrix gives the conservation benefit (b) when two neighboring
% parcels are conserved.
% The B4 matrix gives the conservation benefit (b) when three neighboring
% parcels are conserved.
% To solve the spatially-independent problem define B1 and then set
% B1=B2=B3=B4.
iterations=0;
for z = 0.02:0.02:1
iterations = iterations + 1;
for zz = 1:1000
C = randi([0,4],2,4);
B1
B2
B3
B4

=
=
=
=

[6 5 4 2; 1 3 5 6];
[9 8 5 5; 2 6 8 9];
[11 10 7 7; 3 8 10 11];
[0 11 9 0; 0 9 11 0];

%
%
%
%
%
%

WTA for each parcel is randomly assigned on the
uniform distribution (0,4).
User input.
User input.
User input.
User input.

V = z %User input.
% Find optimal landscape. (Find X-star-i) vector, net benefit, etc. This
% calls the function 'findoptimal.m.'
conserveoption=ones(2,4);
[NB,BSumFinal,Pattern,FinalB,CSum]=findoptimal(C,B1,B2,B3,B4,V,conserveoption);
OptNB=NB; OptBSum=BSumFinal; OptPattern=Pattern; OptB=FinalB;
% OptPattern gives a value of '1' in a cell if the parcel is optimally conserved and
% a 0 otherwise.
%Find W(X-star-i) for each conserved parcel i.
for j=1:2; for k=1:4;
index=ones(2,4); index(j,k)=0; BV(j,k)=BSumFinal-sum(sum(C.*Pattern.*index));
end; end;
W=BV.*Pattern; % The matrix 'W' gives the values of "W(X-star-i)".
% The value for each parcel is given at the parcel's location
% on the landscape.
% Find X-star-~i for each conserved parcel i.
count = 0;
Wnoti=zeros(2,4);
for j=1:2; for k=1:4;
if OptPattern(j,k)==1
count = count + 1;
conserveoption=ones(2,4);
conserveoption(j,k)=0;
[NB,BSumFinal,Pattern,FinalB,CSum]=findoptimal(C,B1,B2,B3,B4,V,conserveoption);
OptNBnoti(count,1)=NB; OptBSumnoti(count,1)=BSumFinal; OptPatternnoti(((count1)*2)+1:count*2,1:4)=Pattern; OptBnoti(((count-1)*2)+1:count*2,1:4)=FinalB;
% Find W(X-star-~i) for each conserved i.
Wnoti(j,k)=BSumFinal-sum(sum(C.*Pattern));

%
%
%
%
%

The matrix 'Wnoti' gives the
values of "W(X-star-~i)".
The value for each parcel is given
at the parcel's location on the
landscape.

end; end; end

% Calculate Delta-W(i)and calculate other solution data
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deltaWi = W - Wnoti;
% Payments given out to each parcel owner.
sumdeltaWi(iterations,zz) = sum(sum(deltaWi)); % Sum of payments.
finallandscape=zeros(2,4);
% Initialize the landscape.
finallandscape(deltaWi>0)=1;
% A parcel is assigned a value of 1 if given a
% payment.
finalcost=C.*finallandscape;
% Map of opportunity cost (OC) of conservation.
% Total OC of conservation.
finalcostsum(iterations,zz)=sum(sum(finalcost));
finalcostvar(iterations,zz)=var([C(1,:) C(2,:)]);
% Variance in OC of conservation
% across parcels.
end; end
% Place simulation results in summary tables.
sumdeltaWiAvg = mean(sumdeltaWi,2);
sumdeltaWiPerc = prctile(sumdeltaWi,[0 5 95 100],2);
finalcostsumAvg = mean(finalcostsum,2);
finalcostsumPerc = prctile(finalcostsum,[0 5 95 100],2);
zzz = 0.02:0.02:1;
finaloutputsummary = [zzz' sumdeltaWiAvg sumdeltaWiPerc finalcostsumAvg
finalcostsumPerc];
clearvars -except finaloutputsummary
% Function that is called by code above.
function [NB,BSumFinal,Pattern,FinalB,CSum] =
findoptimal(C,B1,B2,B3,B4,V,conserveoption)
NB=0; % Initialize NB at 0
Pattern=zeros(2,4); % Initialize landscape at 0
%Finds optimal landscape. (X-star-i). Loops over all possible conservation patterns
given ‘conserveoption’ restrictions.
for a=0:conserveoption(1,1); for b=0:conserveoption(1,2); for c=0:conserveoption(1,3);
for d=0:conserveoption(1,4);
for e=0:conserveoption(2,1); for f=0:conserveoption(2,2); for g=0:conserveoption(2,3);
for h=0:conserveoption(2,4);
B = B1;
if
if
if
if
if

b==1 || e==1; B(1,1)=B2(1,1); end;
b==1 && e==1; B(1,1)=B3(1,1); end;
a==1 || c==1 || f==1; B(1,2)=B2(1,2); end;
(a==1 && c==1) || (a==1 && f==1) || (c==1 && f==1); B(1,2)=B3(1,2); end;
(a==1 && c==1 && f==1); B(1,2)=B4(1,2); end;

if b==1 || d==1 || g==1; B(1,3)=B2(1,3); end;
if (b==1 && d==1) || (b==1 && g==1) || (d==1 && g==1); B(1,3)=B3(1,3); end;
if (b==1 && d==1 && g==1); B(1,3)=B4(1,3); end;
if c==1 || h==1; B(1,4)=B2(1,4); end;
if c==1 && h==1; B(1,4)=B3(1,4); end;
if a==1 || f==1; B(2,1)=B2(2,1); end;
if a==1 && f==1; B(2,1)=B3(2,1); end;
if b==1 || e==1 || g==1; B(2,2)=B2(2,2); end;
if (b==1 && e==1) || (b==1 && g==1) || (e==1 && g==1); B(2,2)=B3(2,2); end;
if (b==1 && e==1 && g==1); B(2,2)=B4(2,2); end;
if c==1 || f==1 || h==1; B(2,3)=B2(2,3); end;
if (c==1 && f==1) || (c==1 && h==1) || (f==1 && h==1); B(2,3)=B3(2,3); end;
if (c==1 && f==1 && h==1); B(2,3)=B4(2,3); end;
if d==1 || g==1; B(2,4)=B2(2,4); end;
if d==1 && g==1; B(2,4)=B3(2,4); end;
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BSum=sum(sum(B.*[a b c d; e f g h]))*V; % Total conservation benefit on landscape.
CSum=sum(sum(C.*[a b c d; e f g h]));
% Total cost on landscape.
% Retain the landscape that maximizes NB. The landscape that maximizes NB is passed
% back to the main program.
if BSum-CSum>NB
NB = BSum-CSum; BSumFinal = BSum; Pattern=[a b c d; e f g h]; FinalB = B;
end
end;end;end;end;end;end;end;end;
% If no landscape generates positive NB a null solution is passed back to the main
% program.
if NB==0
BSumFinal=0; Pattern=zeros(2,4); FinalB = 0; CSum=0;
end
end

SI 6. MATLAB code for this simulation graphed in Figure S2
%
%
%
%

The code is constructed for a 2 x 4 landscape with spatially dependent
benefits. The rows are labeled A and B in the paper and the columns are
labeled 1 through 4 in the paper. A letter-number combination, for example, A4,
gives the parcel's address on the map.

% The C matrix gives conservation costs.
% The B1 matrix gives the conservation benefit (b) when no neighboring
% parcel is conserved.
% The B2 matrix gives the conservation benefit (b) when one neighboring
% parcel is conserved.
% The B3 matrix gives the conservation benefit (b) when two neighboring
% parcels are conserved.
% The B4 matrix gives the conservation benefit (b) when three neighboring
% parcels are conserved.
% To solve the spatially-independent problem define B1 and then set B1=B2=B3=B4.
iterations=0;
for z = 0.02:0.02:1
iterations = iterations + 1;
for zz = 1:1000
% Ensures that the distribution of costs over landscape for each iteration has a
% mean between 1.95 and 2.05 where costs are drawn from a uniform distribution on
% the interval(0,4).
avgC = 0;
while avgC > 2.05 || avgC < 1.95
C = randi([0,4],2,4);
avgC = sum(sum(C))/8;
end
B1
B2
B3
B4

=
=
=
=

[6 5 4 2; 1 3 5 6];
[9 8 5 5; 2 6 8 9];
[11 10 7 7; 3 8 10 11];
[0 11 9 0; 0 9 11 0];

%
%
%
%

User
User
User
User

input.
input.
input.
input.
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V = z % User input.
% Find optimal landscape. (Find X-star-i) vector, net benefit, etc. This
% calls the function 'findoptimal.m.'
conserveoption=ones(2,4);
[NB,BSumFinal,Pattern,FinalB,CSum]=findoptimal(C,B1,B2,B3,B4,V,conserveoption);
OptNB=NB; OptBSum=BSumFinal; OptPattern=Pattern; OptB=FinalB;
% OptPattern gives a value of '1' in a cell if the parcel is optimally conserved and
% a 0 otherwise.
% Find W(X-star-i) for each conserved i.
for j=1:2; for k=1:4;
index=ones(2,4); index(j,k)=0; BV(j,k)=BSumFinal-sum(sum(C.*Pattern.*index));
end; end;
W=BV.*Pattern; % The matrix 'W' gives the values of "W(X-star-i)".
% The value for each parcel is given at the parcel's location
% on the landscape.
%Find X-star-~i for each conserved i.
count = 0;
Wnoti=zeros(2,4);
for j=1:2; for k=1:4;
if OptPattern(j,k)==1
count = count + 1;
conserveoption=ones(2,4);
conserveoption(j,k)=0;
[NB,BSumFinal,Pattern,FinalB,CSum]=findoptimal(C,B1,B2,B3,B4,V,conserveoption);
OptNBnoti(count,1)=NB; OptBSumnoti(count,1)=BSumFinal; OptPatternnoti(((count1)*2)+1:count*2,1:4)=Pattern; OptBnoti(((count-1)*2)+1:count*2,1:4)=FinalB;
%Find W(X-star-~i) for each conserved i.
Wnoti(j,k)=BSumFinal-sum(sum(C.*Pattern));

%
%
%
%
%

The matrix 'Wnoti' gives the
values of "W(X-star-~i)".
The value for each parcel is given
at the parcel's location on the
landscape.

end; end; end

% Calculate Delta-W(i)and calculate other solution data.
deltaWi = W - Wnoti;
% Payments given out to each parcel owner.
sumdeltaWi(iterations,zz) = sum(sum(deltaWi)); % Sum of payments.
finallandscape=zeros(2,4);
% Initialize the landscape.
finallandscape(deltaWi>0)=1;
% A parcel is assigned a value of 1 if given a
% payment.
finalcost=C.*finallandscape;
% Map of opportunity cost (OC) of conservation.
finalcostsum(iterations,zz)=sum(sum(finalcost));
% Total OC of conservation.
finalcostvar(iterations,zz)=var([C(1,:) C(2,:)]);
% Variance in OC of conservation
% across parcels.
end; end
% Place simulation results in summary tables.
sumdeltaWiAvg = mean(sumdeltaWi,2);
sumdeltaWiPerc = prctile(sumdeltaWi,[0 5 95 100],2);
finalcostsumAvg = mean(finalcostsum,2);
finalcostsumPerc = prctile(finalcostsum,[0 5 95 100],2);
zzz = 0.02:0.02:1;
finaloutput = [zzz' (sumdeltaWi-finalcostsum)./finalcostsum finalcostvar];
finaloutputsummary = [zzz' sumdeltaWiAvg sumdeltaWiPerc finalcostsumAvg
finalcostsumPerc];

35 | P a g e

clearvars -except finaloutput finaloutputsummary
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SI Figure Legends
Figure S1: Simulated mean and 5th and 95th percentile values of the sum of conservation
payments and conservation opportunity cost on the example landscape for various levels of V.
Figure S2: Simulated mean ratio of aggregate information rent to conservation opportunity cost
generated on the optimal landscape across two landscape dimensions: variance in WTA and V.
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Figure S1
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Figure SI2
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